## THE RIGHTIST DRIVE AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, our system is based upon the belief that the people can direct their own affairs through self-government. But, to do so, they must get the facts. One of the most objectionable features of the far right—and a reason why it is a radical and not a conservative movement—is that it refuses to deal with the facts.

A case in point is the civil rights bill. The far right is not content to deal with what is in the bill, as true conservatives would be.

The far right must inflate the bill to 10 times its actual size and then paint it red. Suddenly it is a "socialist omnibus bill," it will make the Attorney General a dictator and will have the Federal Government looking down the throat of us all. The most comical departure from fact is the charge that the bill is being railroaded through Congress. No doubt, judging from the mental bent of these people, they are thinking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which is the longest, and, quite often, the slowest railroad in the world. The comedy ends, however, when millions of Americans swallow the bait and take them seriously.

The editor of the Lewiston (Idaho) Morning Tribune has given us the right perspective in a recent editorial.

He lays out the emotional message of T. Coleman Andrews and allows it to speak for itself. It sounds a little foolish next to the incisive rationality of the editor, Mr. Bill Johnston.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD the editorial, "Rightist Drive Against Civil Rights," as published in the February 27 edition of the Lewiston Morning Tribune.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RIGHTIST DRIVE AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS

The propaganda campaign against the civil rights bill rises in fervor as the measure approaches consideration in the Senate. Right-wing extremists increasingly are leading the attack, and their arguments are becoming poisonously vituperative.

A sample of the propaganda is a news release from T. Coleman Andrews, the former Commisioner of Internal Revenue who has been a darling of the radical rightists for some years with his opposition to a Federal income tax and sponsorship of other right-wing objectives.

"The most insidious piece of legislation in the history of our country is now being railroaded through Congress," Andrews writes. "Its passage would destroy our rights to govern our own lives."

(The nerve of some people. The civil rights bill, now awaiting an almost certain assault by filibuster in the Senate, in which it will be subjected to every delaying and crippling procedure known to the crafty senatorial veterans of the once-solid South, is claimed here to be a bill which is "now being railroaded through Congress.")

Andrews continues with his fanatic interpretation of the bill:

"Few Americans, especially businessmen, realize that this vicious measure would convert this Nation into a police state under the direction and control of a powerful central government. Its effects would adversely affect everyone, black and white alike.

"Like all such schemes, this Socialist omnibus bill—misnamed civil rights bill—is sponsored and pushed under the guise of do-goodism. The phrases, "guaranteeing rights for minorities" and "ending discrimination" cover its real aim, the subjection of 185 million Americans to an all-powerful centralized Washington bureaucracy.

"If Congress passes the civil rights bill, the U.S. Attorney General will thereby be made a dictator with practically unlimited powers. His 'inspectors' will swarm, snooping and prying, over the countryside—as if Judicator Warren and his presumptuous usurpations were not enough.

"This proposed legislation goes far beyond the wildest hopes of the Socialists-liberals. It impairs the right of homeowners to be the sole judges of to whom they will rent, lease or sell their homes; it impairs the right of employers to hire or discharge as they see fit; it impairs the seniority rights of employees, union and nonunion alike; and it impairs the right of banks and other institutions to make loans and extend credit in accordance with their best judgment."

Andrews goes on and on with this impassioned drivel. There is not the slightest suggestion anywhere in his diatribe that nobody could possibly be convicted under the civil rights bill unless he could be proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated the antidiscrimination provisions of the law. As Andrews sees it, any infringement of the right of any individual to deprive other individuals of the civil rights guaranteed them under the Constitution in itself is a usurpation. The argument is idiotic, but it is being promoted across the Nation with all the zeal and fervor that characterizes the propaganda campaign of the radical right.

True conservatism in the United States has been mocked and maligned of late by the extreme rightists who have adopted the label. Perhaps nothing in the radical right movement is more distressing, however, than the emergence of this furious drive to keep Negroes in political, educational, and economic bondage in the name of "conservatism."

## THE CASE AGAINST GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, of the University of Chicago is our Nation's most distinguished academic analyst of international relations. In the March 15 issue of the Washington Post, Professor Morgenthau published an enlightened article entitled "Attack Hanoi, Rile Peking: The Case Against Greater U.S. Involvement in Vietnam." In this thoughtful article, he points out:

Whoever wants to carry the war to North Vietnam must be ready to fight China.

I ask unanimous consent to have this important and provocative article inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ATTACK HANOI, RILE PEKING—THE CASE AGAINST GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

(By Hans J. Morgenthau)

In the Washington Post of March 1, Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, of Columbia University advanced five arguments against General de Gaulle's proposal for the neutralization of southeast Asia and in favor of what I take to be a deeper U.S. military involvement in the affairs of Vietnam.

First, he said, neutralization will not work; second, if South Vietnam goes, all of southeast Asia and perhaps even all of Asia will follow; third, China can be contained as Europe has been; fourth, our military disengagement would strengthen China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which then would become more aggressive in its dealings with the West, and finally, the loss of South Vietnam would strengthen the exereme rightwing in American domestic politics.

Of these arguments, the first and the last have merit. One can easily admit that an administration that would order a military disengagement from South Vietnam would not increase its shortrun popularity at home, and that neutralization, if it is not a direct function of the existing balance of military power, is always tenuous.

It must, however, be pointed out that of the three examples Professor Brzezinski mentions, only Austria can be said to owe its neutralization to direct military pressure. It is not the military pressure of the West that has protected the neutral status of Finland and Yugoslavia, but complex political factors, most of which are not of the West's making.

Thus neutralization is not necessarily the simple function of a military equation, and there are gradations of neutrality, as the examples of Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia show, from complete detachment to the predominance of the political influence of one side or the other.

Points two and three are the weakest links in Professor Brzezinski's argumentation. They are a revival of notions that were advanced a decade ago and which are supported neither by reason nor historic experience. The domino theory, that if one nation of southeast Asia should go Communist, all the other nations of southeast Asia, if not of Asia, would necessarily follow, was used in order to urge the United States to intervene in the Indochina war on the side of France.

Half of Vietnam and of Laos have gone Communist, but nobody else has. And one could well imagine, conversely, that, say, Burma or Indonesia might have gone Communist without communism making any inroads whatsoever in Indochina.

The triumph or defeat of communism in a particular country is not simply a byproduct of what happens or does not happen in another country. What will happen in Vietnam can be no more than one factor among many, and most certainly not the decisive one, that will influence developments in other countries.

It should hardly be necessary to point to the fundamental differences between the containment of the Soviet Union in Europe and the containment of China in Asia. The success of the containment of the Soviet Union has been due to the plausible military threat of unacceptable damage and to the political and economic strength of the nations to be protected. Neither of these factors is present in Asia, and I shall return to this argument in a moment.

Finally, the argument that our military disengagement would prove the Chinese position correct in competition with the Soviet point of view is predicated on the assumption that what is happening in South Vietnam is being planned, directed and supported by China. I know of no evidence to support that assumption. Not being the result of Chinese policies, events in South Vietnam can have no bearing upon the outcome of the Soviet-Chinese conflict.

But even if one were to concede the validity of all these arguments, the case in favor of a deeper military involvement in the affairs of Vietnam could not rest on them. For in foreign policy, it is never enough to demonstrate the adverse results that will ensue from a certain course of action. One must also demonstrate that a different course of action will have less adverse results.

In other words, the wise political decision is always the choice of the lesser evil, resulting from a comparison of the likely results of several courses of action. Such a comparison, so it seems to me, argues against

a deeper military involvement in Vietnam.

The proposal to extend the war to North Vietnam rests upon two assumptions: that there exists a direct causal nexus between the war in South Vietnam and the policies of the North Vietnamese government and that the war in South Vietnam can be won by rupturing this causal nexus. Both assumptions are open to serious doubt.

The war is first of all a South Vietnamese civil war, aided and abetted by the North Vietnamese government but neither created nor sustained by it. Anybody who has traveled in Vietnam must recognize that anything more than token support extended by North Vietnam to, say, the guerrillas in the Mekong Delta, over a distance of 1,000 miles and carried by human bodies, is a physical impossibility.

The truth of the matter is that the Vietcong supply themselves with captured American weapons as they recruit themselves from the people of South Vietnam, and that the Government of South Vietnam would have won the war long ago if its army knew what it was fighting for and had the will to fight for it.

Even if the Government of North Vietnam had the power to end the civil war in South Vietnam by withdrawing its support, it would certainly require more than some token raids to bring North Vietnam to its knees. And is it conceivable that China, in view of its national interest, confirmed by 2,000 years of history and the recent experiences in Korea and Laos, would remain idle if this should come to pass?

In other words, whoever wants to carry the war to North Vietnam must be ready to fight China. And those who tend to dismiss Chinese intervention as a minor complication ought to ponder what General MacArthur reported to Washington December 3, 1950: "The small command, actually under present conditions, is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war, and unless some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can be reasonably contemplated."

We are here in the presence of a persistent quality of our China policy which Prof. Tang Tsou has demonstrated in his "America's Failure in China": we set ourselves goals which cannot be achieved with the means we are willing to employ. If we want to contain communism in Asia by striking at its source behind the present line of demarcation, we must be ready to strike at the sources of China's power itself.

If we are not ready to do that, we must trim our objectives to the measure of the means we are willing to employ. Any other course of action will conjure up unmanageable complications at home and abroad. For nothing is more likely to restore the unity of the Communist camp than a war between the United States and China, and nothing is more likely to endanger American democracy than a war against China which we are not able to win and cannot afford to lose.

## THE POLITICAL YEAR OF THE QUIET SUN

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, from time to time during the past 3 years, it has been my privilege to have printed in the RECORD, speeches by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

The latest in this series of sparkling discourses to come to my attention was delivered by Secretary Cleveland in New York on February 27. It is entitled "The Political Year of the Quiet Sun," and is devoted to a discussion of International Cooperation Year—1965—so designated by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In his speech, Mr. Cleveland notes:

The international community will only be built brick by brick. Those who wish to help build it, and not merely talk about building it, will concentrate on the next brick—on how it can be fashioned, where it belongs, how it will fit, when it should be added to the structure.

So those who want to abolish war must work at building machinery for keeping the peace. Those who want to help the process of disarmament must help the process of creating and strengthening and improving the institutions of peaceful settlement and peaceful change. I would hope therefore that our peace organizations would begin to turn more to calculating how to improve the machinery of the United Nations and regional institutions and less to calculations of nuclear inventories—that they would seek to become not amateur military experts but professional experts in the management of peace.

Here is a call, Mr. President, which I would hope all will heed. I ask that the full text of Secretary Cleveland's speech may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE POLITICAL YEAR OF THE QUIET SUN

(Address by the Honorable Harlan Cleveland before the Conference Group of U.S. National Organizations of the United Nations at the Carnegie International Center in New York City at 12:30 p.m., e.s.t., Thursday, February 27, 1964)

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided that 1965 would be International Cooperation Year—a political Year of the Quiet Sun.

Fortunately, the U.S. Government needed no reminder of the value of international cooperation. We were working at it year in and year out well before the U.N. resolution was passed. We shall be working at it long after 1965. But we were delighted to vote for a year of international cooperation and I am delighted to come at your invitation to talk about the ICY to you who are the most active constituency of internation cooperation.

As things stand today, the International Cooperation Year is not much more than a slogan embedded in a resolution by the U.N. General Assembly. But a lot of good ideas—like liberty, freedom, bread, and peace—are slogans, too, until somebody does something about them.

I take it that your purpose and mine is to do something about the International Cooperation Year—to give substance to the slogan, reality to the idea, life to the concept, action to the words.

Is this going about things backwards—putting the cart before the horse? Not at all. The idea has to come before the action if the action is to have any purpose.

Besides—and this will be my main point today—some action is well underway—some of the substance is already there—we already know the direction in which we want to move.

From time to time I hear someone say plaintively: "We really must start building an international community." Where have these people been? International cooperation is a fact of life—indeed it is the most important fact of life in the second half of the 20th century. And some fairly substantial beginnings of an international community already exist under their very noses.

This is not a question of giving substance to a slogan, but of giving currency to descriptions of an existing phenomenon. So I think it is high time to give a name—to unfurl a banner—over what has in fact been going on intensively for the past decade and a half and hesitantly for longer than that.

The trouble is that the thunder and tumult of the cold war has obscured a great spurt in international cooperation in the postwar world. The polemics of a bipolar world and the awful reality of the nuclear arms race have hidden the foundations of the rising international community. And the notion persists that agreement or disagreement among nations is complete at any given time—that you cannot hold opposing views on subject "A" and simultaneously cooperate on subject "B."

This, of course, is nonsense, and the proof can be found wherever you look. We disagree with the Soviet Union, for example, on Berlin, Vietnam, and Cuba. But at the same time we cooperate with the Soviet Union in cultural exchange programs, in allocating radio frequencies, forecasting the weather, managing air transport, fighting disease, studying the oceans, and dozens of other technical ways. We even cooperate, where we can, on trade problems and the peaceful settlement of other people's disputes.

Most people seem to think that the United States has a national space program and isn't it a shame there is no international cooperation? The fact is that the United States is cooperating in its space program with more than 50 countries; we are making some progress in developing international law for outer space; and we are just beginning to cooperate directly with the Soviet Union in limited space experiments. I think it is fair to say that our outstanding offers of cooperation exceed by quite a margin the willingness of others to cooperate with us.

The plain fact is that international cooperation—that is, the building of international institutions—has gone on during the past decade and a half in parallel with the nuclear arms race and in spite of all the fussing and feuding among non-nuclear powers.

This has not happened because world leaders have heard the prayers of the people for a more secure system of world order. We like to think that some important steps toward international cooperation—the Marshall plan, the point 4 program, the Alliance for Progress, atoms for peace, food for peace, and perhaps a few others—do in fact reflect a healthy and perhaps quite unprecedented degree of enlightenment in high office. And we take a certain pride in the fact that the growth of the United Nations family of agencies has been attended by consistent U.S. support and frequent U.S. initiative.

But the main reason for all the internationalism these days is just that, as the Secretary of State has said, "International organization is a plain necessity of our times." There is enough international cooperation to have a year about, for two simple reasons—a technological imperative and a political imperative.

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The political imperative is our basic value system: The kind of safe and open world we want to live in, the kinds of rights and opportunities we want to see secured to every human being. So we naturally are working toward a world of peaceful change under a system of order based on consent in which cooperation is an international way of life. Our basic value system dictates that kind of foreign policy.

So do our basic national interests. In spite of its great power, the United States cannot alone be policeman to the world. Indeed, the paradoxical fact is that because we are so big, we can no longer do much of anything by ourselves—which is reason enough to work hard to build international peacekeeping machinery to take on the sometimes unhappy policeman's lot.